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Introduction	  Aldo	  Antonelli’s	  untimely	  death	  is	  a	  sad	  loss	  to	  our	  profession.	  We	  have	  been	  asked	  by	   the	   editors	  of	   the	   Journal	   of	  Philosophical	   Logic	   to	  write	   a	   short	   comment	  on	  his	  most	  recent	  work,	  published	  in	  this	  issue,	  based	  in	  part	  on	  a	  referee	  report	  by	  one	  of	  us,	  that,	  unfortunately,	  did	  not	  reach	  Aldo	  in	  time.	  	  	  Here	   is	  what	  appeals	   to	  us	   in	   the	   innovative	  work	   in	  Antonelli	  2013,	  2015.	  There	   is	  a	   long	  history	  of	  attempts	  to	  reanalyze	  the	  semantics	  of	  first-­‐order	  predicate	  logic,	  the	  most	  basic	  system	   in	  our	   field.	  What	  many	  of	   these	   attempts	  have	   in	   common	   is	   a	   search	   for	   specific	  parameters	  in	  the	  ‘standard	  semantics’	  given	  by	  Tarski	  that	  might	  be	  naturally	  modified	  or	  generalized.	   A	   further	   motive	   has	   been	   the	   issue	   whether	   the	   famous	   ‘undecidability	   of	  predicate	   logic’	   is	   truly	  an	   intrinsic	   inescapable	  property	  of	   this	   system,	  or	  a	   side	  effect	  of	  decisions	   concerning	   its	   semantic	   design	   that	   could	   have	   gone	   differently.	   In	   our	   paper	  Andréka,	  van	  Benthem	  and	  Németi	  1998,	  we	  presented	  one	  such	  reanalysis,	   going	  back	   to	  earlier	   work	   in	   relativized	   cylindric	   set	   algebra	   (Crs),	   making	   the	   choice	   of	   variable	  assignments,	   or	  modal	   ‘states’,	   an	   explicit	   parameter	   in	   first-­‐order	  models,	   and	  modifying	  the	   semantics	   of	   quantifiers	   accordingly.	   This	   generalized	   semantics	   validates	   a	   decidable	  core	  logic	  inside	  standard	  first-­‐order	  logic,	  and	  we	  were	  also	  able	  to	  show	  that	  this	  system	  is	  closely	   tied	   to	   the	   Guarded	   Fragment,	   a	   large	   decidable	   slice	   of	   first-­‐order	   logic	   under	   its	  standard	   semantics.	   In	   a	   recent	   paper	   Andréka,	   van	   Benthem,	   Bezhanishvili	   and	   Németi	  2014,	   we	   returned	   to	   the	   issue	   of	   generalizing	   existing	   semantics	   via	   Henkin-­‐style	  modifications	   of	   models,	   covering	   second-­‐order	   moves,	   algebraic	   approaches,	   and	   others,	  and	  we	  thought	  that	  we	  had	  pretty	  much	  covered	  all	  existing	  strategies.	  	  
A	   new	   semantics	   and	   logic	   Against	   this	   background,	   here	   is	   a	   surprising	   new	   angle,	  overlooked	  so	  far	  to	  the	  best	  of	  our	  knowledge	  –	  although	  we	  will	  find	  some	  precursors	  later	  on	   in	   work	   on	   generalized	   quantifiers	   from	   the	   1970s.	   Antonelli	   2013	   proposes	   a	   non-­‐standard	   semantics	   for	   languages	   with	   arbitrary	   generalized	   quantifiers.	   Applied	   to	   the	  existential	  quantifier	  of	  first-­‐order	  logic,	  this	  semantics	  reads	  as	  follows:	  	  	  	   M,	  s	  |=	  Ex.ϕ	  iff	  (a)	  there	  exists	  an	  object	  d	  in	  M	  with	  M,	  s[x:=d]	  |=	  ϕ,	  	  	  	   and	  (b)	  the	  set	  of	  all	  witnesses	  d	  of	  this	  sort	  belongs	  to	  a	  family	  PM	  	  	  of	  subsets	  that	  has	  been	  specified	  in	  advance	  as	  part	  of	  the	  model.	  4	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  4	  Technically,	  Antonelli’s	  semantics	  uses	  a	  function	  f	  assigning	  to	  every	  set	  S	  a	  subset	  f(S)	  of	  the	  full	  power	  set	  P(S).	  Any	  quantifier	  Q	  then	  gets	  its	  usual	  denotation	  taken	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  Henkin-­‐style	  ‘generalized	  power	  set’	  PM	  for	  the	  domain	  of	  any	  model	  M.	  Specialized	  to	  the	  first-­‐order	  existential	  quantifier	   ∃,	   with	   standard	   denotation	  ∃(S)	   =	   {X	  ⊆	   S	   :	   X	   non-­‐empty},	   clause	   (a)	   then	   reflects	   the	  meaning	  of	  ∃,	  while	  (b)	  comes	  from	  the	  nonstandard	  power	  sets.	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In	  what	  follows,	  we	  will	  use	  the	  notation	  Qx.ϕ	  for	  arbitrary	  generalized	  quantifiers,	  Ex.ϕ	  for	  the	   generalized	   reading	   of	   the	   existential	   quantifier	   described	   just	   now,	   and	   ∃x.ϕ	   for	   the	  standard	  existential	  quantifier	  of	  first-­‐order	  logic.	  	  The	  paper	  Antonelli	  2015	   in	   this	  volume	  shows	   that	   the	   induced	   logic	  over	  ordinary	   first-­‐order	   syntax	   is	   recursively	   axiomatizable.	   The	   author	   gives	   a	   Henkin-­‐style	   completeness	  proof,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  adequate	  semantic	  tableau	  system,	   for	  a	  proof	  calculus	  with	  respect	  to	  his	   generalized	   semantics.	   The	   calculus	   derives	   sequents	  Γ	   |–	  ϕ	   that	   are	   valid	   in	   the	   usual	  local	  sense,	  from	  truth	  of	  the	  premises	  under	  an	  assignment	  to	  truth	  of	  the	  conclusion	  under	  that	   same	   assignment.	   This	   allows	   for	   a	   standard	   deduction	   theorem	   removing	   a	   premise	  from	  Γ	  in	  order	  to	  conditionalize	  a	  conclusion	  ϕ.	  The	  calculus	  has	  three	  principles:	  	  	   T	  	   All	  propositionally	  valid	  rules	  of	  inference.	  	   EXT	  	   Equivalence	  Rule:	  If	  x	  does	  not	  occur	  free	  in	  Γ,	  from	  Γ	  |–	  α	  ↔	  β,	  	  	   	   infer	  Γ	  |–	  Ex.	  α	  ↔	  Ey.	  [y/x]β,	  with	  [y/x]β	  an	  alphabetic	  variant	  of	  β.	  UG	  	  	  	   Universal	  Generalization:	  If	  x	  does	  not	  occur	  free	  in	  Γ,	  	  	   from	  Γ	  |–	  α,	  	  infer	  Γ	  |–	  ¬Ex.	  ¬α..	  	  	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  shown	  that	  full	  first-­‐order	  logic	  arises	  syntactically	  from	  this	  base	  logic	  when	  one	  adds	  all	   instances	  of	   the	  axiom	  ϕ	  →	  Ex.ϕ.	   It	   is	  also	  proved	   that	   first-­‐order	   logic	  arises	  semantically	  from	  the	  base	  logic	  by	  requiring	  the	  non-­‐standard	  power	  sets	  in	  models	  to	  be	  closed	  under	  first-­‐order	  parametrical	  definability.	  Finally,	  the	  paper	  proposes	  a	  proof	  for	  the	  decidability	  of	  the	  new	  base	  logic	  via	  an	  effective	  translation	  into	  the	  Guarded	  Fragment.	  	  As	  Antonelli	  notes,	  we	  have	  the	  beginnings	  of	  a	  new	  program	  here,	  studying	  the	  spectrum	  of	  logics	  and	  semantics	  in	  between	  his	  base	  logic	  and	  full	  first-­‐order	  logic.	  Indeed,	  the	  more	  we	  looked	  at	  his	  system,	  the	  more	  several	  interesting	  things	  started	  striking	  us.	  In	  what	  follows,	  we	   make	   a	   few	   observations	   and	   suggestions	   strengthening	   this	   general	   perspective	   –	  though	  we	  have	  a	  qualification	  about	  the	  claimed	  results	  that	  we	  will	  explain	  in	  due	  course.	  	  
System	   variations	   For	   a	   start,	   analyzing	   the	   above	   syntax	   and	   semantics	   suggests	   a	   few	  natural	  variations.	  We	  list	  a	  few.	  By	  ‘basic	  A-­‐logic’	  we	  mean	  Antonelli’s	  complete	  logic	  given	  above.	   It	   retains	   an	   essential	   feature	   of	   standard	   first-­‐order	   semantics:	   variables	   are	  independent	  of	  each	  other.	  The	  truth	  value	  of	  a	  formula	  ϕ	  in	  a	  model	  M	  under	  an	  assignment	  
s	  only	  depends	  on	  the	  objects	  in	  M	  assigned	  by	  s	  to	  the	  free	  variables	  in	  ϕ.	  This	  is	  reflected	  in	  allowing	  alphabetic	  variants	  in	  the	  Equivalence	  Rule.	  	  	  Typically,	  this	  independence	  fails	  in	  generalized	  semantics	  of	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  modal	  or	  
Crs	   type:	   values	   to	   individual	   variables	   outside	   of	   the	   formula	   may	   matter	   since	   not	   all	  variable	   assignments	   may	   be	   admissible	   in	   a	   model.	   In	   semantics	   of	   the	   latter	   kind,	   the	  Equivalence	  Rule	  only	  holds	  in	  the	  weaker	  version	  	  	  	   EXT’	   from	  	  |–	  α	  ↔	  β	  	  to	  	  |–	  Ex.	  α	  ↔	  Ex.β.	  	  	  This	   is	  the	  basic	  rule	  of	  replacing	  provable	  equivalents	   in	  standard	  algebraic	   logics	  –	  being	  the	  minimum	  required	  for	  a	  compositional	  semantics	  of	  the	  quantifier.	  	  
 3 	  It	  would	  be	  of	  interest	  to	  merge	  the	  two	  lines	  of	  extending	  first-­‐order	  semantics:	  generalized	  power	  sets,	  and	  allowing	  dependencies,	  but	  we	  will	  not	  do	  so	  in	  any	  detail.	  5	  Another	  proof	  system,	  and	  arguably	   the	  base	   logic	   for	  Antonelli’s	   style	  of	  analysis,	  arises	   if	  we	  drop	  even	  the	   (UG)	   rule,	   and	  merely	   retain	   (T)	   and	   (EXT).	   Then	  we	   get	   basic	   classical	   propositional	  logic	  with	  an	  added	  generalized	  quantifier	  Qx.ϕ	  interpreted	  by	  any	  family	  of	  subsets:	  	  	   M,	  s	  |=	  Qx.ϕ	  	  iff	  	  {d	  in	  M	  |	  M,	  s[x:=d]	  |=	  ϕ}	  ∈	  PM	  	  The	   earlier	   truth	   condition	   for	   the	   existential	   quantifier	   Ex	   then	   refers	   to	   a	   generalized	  quantifier	   satisfying	   the	   further	   condition	   that	   all	   its	   subsets	   are	  non-­‐empty.	   In	  particular,	  we	  see	  this	  reflected	  in	  the	  rule	  of	  Universal	  Generalization	  in	  basic	  A-­‐logic.	  In	  the	  presence	  of	  his	  Equivalence	  Rule,	  (UG)	  amounts	  to	  just	  adding	  one	  special	  axiom	  	  	  	   ¬Ex.⊥	  6	  	   	  	  In	   all,	   an	   interesting	   landscape	  of	   new	  weak	   first-­‐order	   logics	   is	   opening	  up	  here,	   starting	  from	  very	  weak	  systems,	  and	  then	  progressively	  adding	  further	  features	  such	  as	  monotoni-­‐city	  or	  distributivity.	  This	  landscape	  lends	  itself	  to	  comparative	  analysis	  in	  terms	  of	  deduc-­‐tive	  power,	  but	  also	  in	  terms	  of	  translations,	  relative	  interpretations,	  or	  other	  connections.	  	  	  
Algebraic	  content	  and	  proof	  analysis	  Playing	  with	  basic	  A-­‐logic	  reveals	  more	  combinatorial	  content	   than	  might	   show	   at	   the	   surface.	   Thus,	   in	   assessing	   this	   system,	   syntax	   and	   proof	  theory	  play	  a	  role	   in	  addition	   to	  semantic	  considerations	  about	   its	  models.	  This	   is	  why	  we	  will	  include	  a	  few	  formal	  derivations	  in	  what	  follows.	  In	  particular,	  we	  find	  it	  instructive	  to	  look	  for	  algebraic	  equations	  that	  the	  quantifiers	  satisfy	  in	  the	  Lindenbaum-­‐Tarski	  algebra	  of	  the	  logic.	  Basic	  A-­‐logic	  obviously	  lacks	  laws	  of	  monotonicity	  or	  distribution	  over	  disjunction,	  but	  it	  does	  validate,	  for	  instance,	  the	  following	  basic	  prenex	  distribution	  law:	  	  	  
	   Ex.	  (α	  ∧	  Ex.	  β)	  ↔	  (Ex.	  α	  ∧	  Ex.	  β)	  7	  	  
                                                5	  Uniformity	  is	  achieved	  in	  Antonelli	  2013	  by	  using	  the	  same	  generalized	  quantifier	  for	  all	  variables.	  A	  weaker	  version	  would	  give	  each	  variable	  x	   its	  own	  quantifier,	  moving	   to	  a	  neighborhood	  version	  of	  the	   modal	   Crs-­‐style	   semantics	   in	   Andréka,	   van	   Benthem,	   and	   Németi,	   1998.	   (This	   suggestion	   was	  made	  by	  Wes	  Holliday.)	  We	  will	  return	  to	  the	  matter	  of	  uniformity	  of	  the	  Antonelli	  semantics	  below.	  	  6	  (T)	  and	  (UG)	  prove	  ¬Ex.	  ⊥,	  using	  an	  empty	  set	  of	  assumptions.	  Conversely,	  if	  we	  can	  prove	  ϕ	  from	  a	  Γ	  not	  containing	  x	  free,	  then	  we	  can	  prove	  ¬ϕ	  ↔	  ⊥	  by	  (T),	  and	  then	  Ex.	  ¬ϕ	  ↔	  Ex.	  ⊥	  by	  the	  Equivalence	  Rule,	  whence	  we	  get	  Γ	  	  |–	  ¬Ex.	  ¬ϕ	  using	  the	  formula	  ¬Ex.	  ⊥	  as	  an	  axiom,	  by	  applying	  the	  (T)	  rule.	  6	  (T)	  and	  (UG)	  prove	  ¬Ex.	  ⊥,	  using	  an	  empty	  set	  of	  assumptions.	  Conversely,	  if	  we	  can	  prove	  ϕ	  from	  a	  Γ	  not	  containing	  x	  free,	  then	  we	  can	  prove	  ¬ϕ	  ↔	  ⊥	  by	  (T),	  and	  then	  Ex.	  ¬ϕ	  ↔	  Ex.	  ⊥	  by	  the	  Equivalence	  Rule,	  whence	  we	  get	  Γ	  	  |–	  ¬Ex.	  ¬ϕ	  using	  the	  formula	  ¬Ex.	  ⊥	  as	  an	  axiom,	  by	  applying	  the	  (T)	  rule.	  
7 Here	   is	  a	  proof	  by	   the	  above	  rules.	   (a)	  From	  the	   (T)-­‐valid	   {Ex.	  β}	  |–	  α	  ↔	   	   (α	  ∧	  Ex.	  β),	  using	   (EXT),	  derive	  {Ex.	  β}	  |–	  Ex.	  α	  ↔	  Ex.	  (α	  ∧	  Ex.	  β).	  It	  follows	  by	  (T)	  that	  |–	  (Ex.	  α	  ∧	  Ex.	  β)	  →	  	  Ex.	  (α	  ∧	  Ex.	  β).	  (b)	  By	  using	  (T)	  once	  more,	  {Ex.	  β}	  |–	  Ex.	  α	  ↔	  Ex.	  (α	  ∧	  Ex.	  β)	  also	  implies	  that	  {Ex.	  β,	  Ex.	  (α	  ∧	  Ex.	  β)}	  |–	  Ex.	  α..	  (c)	  Next,	  from	  the	  (T)-­‐valid	  {¬Ex.	  β}	  |–	  (α	  ∧	  Ex.	  β)	  ↔	  ⊥,	  using	  (EXT),	  derive	  {¬Ex.	  β}	  |–	  Ex.	  (α	  ∧	  Ex.	  β)	  ↔	  
Ex.	  ⊥,	  and	  using	  (T)	  plus	  the	  earlier	  proof	  of	  ¬Ex.	  ⊥,	  derive	  that	  |–	  	  Ex.	  (α	  ∧	  Ex.	  β)	  →	  Ex.	  β.	  Putting	  (b)	  and	  (c)	  together,	  by	  applications	  of	  (T),	  we	  derive	  that	  |–	  Ex.	  (α	  ∧	  Ex.	  β))	  →	  	  (Ex.	  α	  ∧	  Ex.	  β).	  
 4 
Furthermore,	  with	  this	  useful	  principle	  in	  place,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  show,	  for	  instance,	  how	  all	  the	  further	  laws	  of	  a	  standard	  proof	  system	  for	  first-­‐order	  logic,	  such	  as	  monotonicity	  or	  distri-­‐bution	  of	  E	  over	  ∨,	  become	  explicitly	  derivable	  from	  basic	  A-­‐logic	  when	  we	  add	  the	  earlier-­‐mentioned	  axiom	  ϕ	  →	   Ex.ϕ	  of	  Existential	  Generalization.	   8	   Incidentally,	   the	   interest	   in	   this	  syntactic	  exercise	  is	  not	  so	  much	  in	  quickly	  retrieving	  standard	  first-­‐order	  logic	  from	  basic	  
A-­‐logic,	   but	   rather	   to	   get	   a	   concrete	   feeling	  of	  what	  precise	  proof	  power	   returns	  us	   to	   the	  undecidable	  system	  that	  we	  started	  with.	  	  As	   for	   other	   system	  observations,	   it	   also	  makes	   sense	   to	   go	   down	   in	   power	   from	  basic	  A-­‐logic,	  rather	  than	  up.	  For	  instance,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  that	  	  	  
Fact	   Ex.	  Ex.	  Ex.	  α	  ↔	  Ex.	  Ex.	  α	  is	  valid	  in	  basic	  A-­‐logic,	  but	  no	  longer	  valid	  in	  the	  	  weaker	  system	  of	  basic	  Qx-­‐logic.	  But	  Qx.	  Qx.	  Qx.	  Qx.	  α	  ↔	  Qx.	  Qx.	  α	  is	  still	  	  valid	  in	  this	  weaker	  system.	  9	  	  
Semantic	  correspondence	  analysis	  As	  for	  the	  landscape	  of	  logics	  suggested	  by	  Antonelli,	  it	  is	   intuitively	   clear	   how	   various	   intermediate	   axioms	   express	   conditions	   on	   generalized	  quantifiers	   lending	   themselves	   to	   immediate	   semantic	   analysis,	   now	   reading	   formula	  variables	  in	  a	  second-­‐order	  sense	  as	  ranging	  over	  all	  subsets	  of	  the	  model.	  Construed	  in	  this	  way,	  for	  instance,	  the	  additional	  axiom	  of	  	  	   Existential	  Generalization	  	   ϕ	  →	  Ex.ϕ	  	  	  says	  that	  all	  non-­‐empty	  sets	  belong	  to	  the	  Antonelli	  generalized	  quantifier,	  which,	  with	  the	  non-­‐emptiness	   for	   the	  base	   logic,	  makes	   that	  quantifier	   the	   standard	  one.	   Similar	  analyses	  work	  for	  monotonicity	  or	  distribution	  laws	  for	  the	  existential	  quantifier.	  	  
Two	  broader	  perspectives	  Let	  us	  now	  look	  at	  two	  streams	  of	  work	  in	  the	  earlier	  literature	  that	   connect	   with	   the	   program	   of	   exploring	  weak	   predicate	   logics	   sketched	   here.	   In	   each	  case,	  we	  only	  make	  a	  few	  observations,	  mostly	  without	  proof.	  We	  believe	  that	  an	  interesting	  conglomerate	  of	  topics	  is	  coming	  to	  light	  here	  concerning	  decidable	  semantics	  and	  decidable	  fragments	  for	  first-­‐order	  logic,	  that	  we	  will	  address	  at	  greater	  length	  in	  a	  follow-­‐up	  paper.	  	  
	  
                                                8	  These	  facts	  are	  easy	  to	  prove	  using	  the	  auxiliary	  inference	  rule:	  “from	  |–	  ϕ	  →	  Ex.	  ψ	  to	  |–	  	  Ex.	  ϕ	  →	  Ex.	  ψ”	  that	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  our	  prenex	  law.	  9	  For	  a	  change,	  we	  give	  a	  semantic	  proof	   for	   these	  claims.	  Let	  M	  be	  a	  model	  and	  s	  an	  assignment	  of	  objects	  to	  variables.	  For	  any	  formula	  φ,	  set	  X(φ,	  s)	  :=	  {d	  ∈	  M	  :	  M,	  s[x	  :=	  d]	  |=	  φ}.	  Now,	  the	  set	  X(Ex.	  φ,	  s)	  is	   always	   the	   whole	   domain	   of	   M	   or	   the	   empty	   set	   ∅,	   by	   the	   truth	   definition.	   Thus,	   quantifier	  iterations	   with	   the	   same	   variable	   only	   involve	   two	   issues:	   whether	   Q	   accepts	  ∅,	   and	   whether	   it	  accepts	  M.	  Checking	  all	  4	  combinations	  for	  this,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  that	  3	  of	  them	  (including	  the	  Antonelli	  quantifier	  itself)	  satisfy	  the	  equivalence	  Ex.	  Ex.	  α	  ↔	  Ex.	  Ex.	  Ex.	  α.	  However,	  the	  fourth	  quantifier	  Q	  with	  
∅	  ∈	  PM	  and	  with	  M	  ∉	  PM	  keeps	  switching	  its	  truth	  values	  for	  iterations	  in	  each	  round,	  validating	  only	  
Ex.	  Ex.	  α	  ↔	  Ex.	  Ex.	  Ex.	  Ex.	  α.	  Indeed,	  the	  latter	  principle	  holds	  in	  all	  4	  cases.	  We	  could	  even	  go	  further	  with	   these	   prima	   facie	   somewhat	   unusual	   principles,	   and	   classify	   generalized	   quantifiers	   by	   their	  behavior	  on	  the	  preceding	  iteration	  laws.	  
 5 
Logics	   of	   generalized	   quantifiers	   Logics	   with	   added	   generalized	   quantifiers	   have	   been	  studied	   extensively	   since	   the	   1950s,	   although	   these	   systems	   largely	   consisted	   of	   systems	  
FOL(Q)	   consisting	   of	   first-­‐order	   logic	   in	   its	   standard	   interpretation	   with	   some	   new	  generalized	  quantifier	  Q	   added.	  Going	  one	   step	   further,	  Väänänen	  1978	   considers	   systems	  that	  add	  the	  generalized	  quantifier	  to	  a	  propositional	  base	  without	  the	  standard	  first-­‐order	  quantifiers	   present	   –	   though	   still	   retaining	   the	   standard	   assumption,	   coming	   already	   from	  Mostowski	   and	   Lindström,	   that	   the	   sets	   in	   the	   quantifier	   be	   closed	   under	   isomorphism,	  making	   the	  quantifier	  express	  essentially	  a	  numerical	  criterion.	   In	  particular,	  Anapolitanos	  and	   Väänänen	   1981	   showed	   that	   the	   weakest	   such	   logic	   is	   decidable,	   using	   a	   semantic	  tableau	   technique.	  We	  cannot	  survey	   this	  work	  here,	  but	  merely	  note	   that	   it	   shows	   formal	  resemblances	  to	  Antonelli’s	  program,	  even	  though	  the	  generalized	  quantifiers	  in	  Antonelli’s	  semantics	  are	  not	  necessarily	  closed	  under	  isomorphic	  images.	  10	  	  These	   remarks	   are	   just	   a	   start.	   We	   believe	   that	   many	   existing	   results	   and	   themes	   from	  current	   generalized	  quantifier	   theory	   (cf.	   the	   survey	  Peters	   and	  Westerståhl	   2006)	   can	  be	  brought	  to	  bear	  on	  generalized	  semantics	  for	  weak	  predicate	  logics.	  	  	  
Intermezzo:	  Antonelli’s	  proof	  of	  decidability	  This	  is	  a	  good	  point	  to	  mention	  a	  worry	  that	  occurred	  to	  us	  in	  thinking	  through	  Antonelli’s	  decidability	  proof	  for	  his	  logic	  via	  reduction	  to	  the	  Guarded	  Fragment.	  We	  believe	  that	  the	  result	  is	  correct,	  but	  that	  the	  argument	  as	  stated	  is	  flawed	  –	  though	  in	  an	  interesting	  way.	  	  	  Antonelli’s	  proof	  gives	  a	   translation	   tr	   from	  the	  basic	  quantifier	   language	   that	   involves	   the	  following	  essential	  clause:	  	  	   tr(Qx.	  ϕ(x,	  y))	  =	  	  	   ∃u(G+(x,	  u,	  y)	  ∧	  ∀z(G+(z,	  u,	  y)	  →	  tr(ϕ(z,	  y))	  ∧	  ∀z(G–(z,	  u,	  y)	  →	  ¬tr(ϕ(z,	  y)))	  	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  show	  that,	  if	  a	  formula	  in	  Antonelli’s	  language	  has	  a	  model	  as	  described	  above,	  its	   translation	   is	   in	   the	   Guarded	   Fragment,	   and	   it	   has	   a	   two-­‐sorted	   standard	   model	   that	  treats	   subsets	   as	  new	  objects,	  with	   an	  obvious	   interpretation	  of	   the	   two	  guard	  predicates.	  Next,	  one	  shows	  that,	  if	  a	  guarded	  formula	  tr(ϕ)	  has	  an	  arbitrary	  standard	  model,	  this	  model	  induces	   what	   Antonelli	   calles	   a	   ‘multi-­‐dimensional	   model’	   for	   ϕ	   where	   the	   generalized	  quantifier	   now	   consists	   of	   a	   set	   of	   finite	   tuples	   of	   objects:	   these	   sets	   arise	   because	   of	   the	  dependence	  of	   the	  guard	  predicates	  on	   the	   tuples	  of	  objects	  assigned	   to	   the	  parameters	  y.	  Interpretation	  of	  Qx.	  ϕ(x,	  y)	  then	  checks	  whether	  the	  set	  of	  witness	  tuples	  (e,	  d),	  with	  d	  the	  fixed	  objects	  assigned	  to	  the	  parameter	  variables	  y,	  belongs	  to	  the	  quantifier.	  	  	  Finally,	  Antonelli	   claims	   that	  we	   can	  go	  one	   step	   further:	  basic	  A-­‐logic	   as	  defined	  above	   is	  also	  sound	  for	  the	  broader	  class	  of	  multi-­‐dimensional	  models,	  and	  hence	  ϕ	  is	  consistent,	  and	  hence	  by	  his	  completeness	  theorem,	  ϕ	  has	  an	  intended	  model.	  	  
                                                10	   Anapolitanos	   and	  Väänänen	   1981	   do	   consider	   non-­‐isomorphism-­‐closed	  models	   for	   generalized	  quantifiers	  as	  an	  intermediate	  stage	  in	  their	  argument	  before	  giving	  an	  ingenious	  construction	  that	  guarantees	   permutation	   invariance.	   Conversely,	   with	   the	   same	   specialization	   in	   mind,	   one	   could	  investigate	  versions	  of	  closure	  under	  isomorphism	  for	  Antonelli’s	  semantics.	  
 6 
A	   problem	   We	   believe	   that	   the	   final	   claim	   of	   soundness	   for	   multi-­‐dimensional	   models	   is	  incorrect,	  since	  it	  breaks	  down	  on	  a	  delicate	  point	  of	  notation.	  The	  rule	  (EXT)	  is	  indeed	  valid	  in	  the	  multi-­‐dimensional	  semantics,	  if	  	  	  	   the	  premise	  Γ	  |–	  α	  ↔	  β	  involves	  formulas	  with	  the	  same	  free	  variables	  x,	  y,	  	  	  as	  is	  assumed	  in	  Antonelli’s	  soundness	  proof.	  However,	  the	  general	  rule	  of	  basic	  A-­‐logic	  does	  not	   assume	   this	   equality	   of	   variables,	   and	   it	   should	   not	   –	   since	   in	   general,	   we	   need	   the	  inhomogeneous	  case,	  say	  to	  prove	  the	  validity	  	  	  	   Qx.Px	  ↔	  Qx.(Px	  ∧	  y=y)	  	  But	   in	   the	   latter	   case,	   there	   is	   no	   guarantee	   that	   the	   two	   quantifiers	   introduced	   in	   the	  conclusion,	  referring	  to	  sets	  of	  tuples	  of	  different	  arities,	  support	  an	  equivalence	  –	  and	  one	  can	  also	  see	  that	  Antonelli’s	  guarded	  translations	  do	  not	  yield	  equivalent	  formulas	  here.	  	  Even	   so,	   we	   believe	   that	   Antonelli’s	   decidability	   result	   is	   correct,	   and	   that	   the	   preceding	  difficulty	   can	   be	   fixed	   by	   several	  methods:	   changing	   the	   translation	   to	   one	   going	   into	   the	  larger	   decidable	   ‘loosely	   guarded	   fragment’,	   ‘preprocessing’	   the	   formulas	   first	   modulo	  validity	   to	   improve	   performance	   of	   the	   translation,	   or	   reducing	   to	   generalized	   quantifier	  results	  like	  those	  for	  the	  generalized	  semantics	  of	  Anapolitanos	  &	  Väänänen	  1981.	  However,	  we	   also	   see	   the	   result	   as	   provable	   by	   just	   using	   natural	   direct	   techniques	   for	   establishing	  decidability,	  such	  as	  the	  ‘mosaics’	  of	  Németi	  1995.	  We	  defer	  a	  proof	  to	  a	  follow-­‐up	  paper.	  	  
Local	  generalized	  semantics	  However	  this	  may	  be,	  the	  above	  difficulty	  can	  also	  be	  turned	  into	  a	  positive	  point,	   since	   there	   is	   independent	   interest	   to	   the	   case	  where	   the	  proof	  does	  work.	  Antonelli’s	  guarded	  translation	  does	  establish	  the	  following	  	  
Fact	   A-­‐validity	  is	  decidable	  over	  multi-­‐dimensional	  models.	  	  This	  modified	  observation	  has	   independent	   interest.	   It	   concerns	  a	  natural	   ‘local’	  variant	  of	  the	  original	  uniform	  semantics	  where	  the	  model	  had	  just	  one	  generalized	  quantifier	  for	  the	  Q	  in	   all	   contexts.	   In	   contrast,	   multi-­‐dimensional	   models	   have	   a	   family	   of	   quantifiers	   Qd	  depending	  on	  the	  tuples	  of	  objects	  interpreting	  the	  free	  variables	  in	  formulas	  Qx.	  ϕ(x,	  y).	  This	  distinction	  between	  natural	  local	  and	  uniform	  variants	  will	  return	  below.	  	  	  We	   conclude	   with	   two	   comments.	   First,	   we	   believe	   that	   Antonelli’s	   semantics	   in	   either	  uniform	  or	  local	  variants	  has	  the	  Finite	  Model	  Property.	  Next,	  this	  raises	  the	  interesting	  issue	  of	  finding	  the	  exact	  computational	  complexity	  for	  either	  local	  or	  uniform	  A-­‐logic.	  	  	  Next	  we	  turn	  to	  a	  final	  related	  perspective,	  that	  connects	  up	  with	  both	  Antonelli’s	  semantics	  and	  generalized	  quantifier	  theory	  in	  a	  natural	  way.	  	  	  
Modal	  neighborhood	  models	  Several	  of	  the	  preceding	  points	  suggest	  one	  more	  analogy	  that	  may	  be	  fruitful	  in	  thinking	  about	  Antonelli’s	  program,	  namely,	  with	  modal	  logic.	  	  	  For	   a	   start,	   the	   preceding	   correspondence	   results	   for	   generalized	   quantifier	   axioms	   are	  reminiscent	  of	  modal	  correspondence	  theory	  for	  axioms	  over	  frames.	  Also,	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	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Crs	  semantics	  or	  its	  equivalent	  generalized	  assignment	  semantics	  –	  that	  we	  have	  mentioned	  as	   a	   useful	   comparison	   case	   –	   is	   modal.	   Typically,	   Crs	   models	   validate	   monotonicity	   and	  distribution	  over	  disjunctions,	  just	  as	  in	  the	  minimal	  modal	  logic.	  	  	  But	   if	   there	   is	  a	  modal	  angle	  here,	  why	  are	   the	   latter	  principles	  absent	   from	  basic	  A-­‐logic?	  The	  analogy	  we	  see	  here	   is	  with	  a	  well-­‐known	  semantic	  move	   toward	  generality	   in	  modal	  logic,	  from	  relational	  graph	  models	  to	  neighborhood	  models	  where	  each	  world	  has	  a	  family	  of	  neighborhoods	  attached	  to	  it.	  In	  such	  models,	  	  	   A	  box	  modality	  £ϕ	  is	  true	  at	  world	  s	  if	  ϕ	  holds	  throughout	  some	  neighborhood	  of	  s	  –	  	  or	  in	  a	  still	  more	  minimal	  version	  that	  drops	  even	  upward	  monotonicity,	  if	  the	  set	  of	  all	  worlds	  where	  ϕ	  is	  true	  is	  a	  neighborhood	  of	  s.	  	  Now	   note	   that	   a	   family	   of	   neighborhoods	   as	   used	   here	   is,	   essentially,	   just	   an	   arbitrary	  generalized	  quantifier.	  Thus	  the	  conceptual	  step	  from	  Crs	  models	  to	  Antonelli’s	  generalized	  models	  seems	  similar	  to	  that	  from	  relational	  to	  neighborhood	  models	  in	  modal	  logic.	  In	  this	  light,	   one	   might	   see	   modal	   neighborhood	   languages	   as	   fragments	   of	   the	   full	   first-­‐order	  language	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  generalized	  semantics	  discussed	  here.	  	  	  We	  believe	  that	  this	  analogy	  may	  be	  a	  fruitful	  one,	   including	  the	  taking	  of	  themes	  from	  the	  currently	  quite	  active	  area	  of	  modal	  neighborhood	  semantics	  to	  our	  current	  setting,	  such	  as	  the	  model	  theory	  of	  appropriate	  generalized	  notions	  of	  bisimulation,	  or	  the	  introduction	  of	  richer	  modal	  languages	  suggested	  by	  neighborhood	  models.	  	  	  In	   this	   setting,	   an	   earlier	   point	   returns	   in	   an	   illuminating	   form.	   Neighborhood	  models	   for	  modal	  logic	  have	  local	  families	  of	  sets	  depending	  on	  the	  current	  world.	  This	  is	  a	  special	  case	  of	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  ‘local	  semantics’	  for	  generalized	  quantifiers	  Qd.	  11	  Accordingly,	  basic	  neighborhood	  logic	  is	  local,	  and	  this	  is	  reflected	  in	  its	  validities,	  which	  are	  axiomatized	  by	  a	  minimal	   proof	   system	   that	   just	   contains	   replacement	   of	   equivalents	   and	   propositional	  inference	  –	  with	  upward	  monotonicity	  of	  the	  modality	  added	  for	  the	  monotonic	  version.	  	  	  If	  we	  want	  a	  uniform	  version	  with	  only	  one	  family	  of	  neighborhoods	  (generalized	  quantifier)	  throughout,	   new	  principles	   of	   inference	   are	   needed,	   such	   as	   the	   rule	   that	   (EXT)	   is	   always	  allowed	  from	  sets	  of	  boxed	  premises.	  We	  will	  not	  pursue	  these	  analogies	  with	  A-­‐semantics	  here,	  except	  to	  note	  that	  they	  go	  through	  even	  in	  small	  details.	  12	  	  We	  end	  with	  a	  few	  more	  general	  points	  about	  the	  program	  considered	  here.	  	  
What	   is	   the	   right	   language?	   Often	   generalized	   semantics	   suggest	   richer	   languages	   with	  more	  distinctions	  than	  the	  original	  language	  over	  the	  initial	  models.	  For	  instance,	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  Crs	  semantics	  has	  new	  ‘polyadic	  quantifiers’	  	  	  
                                                11	  In	  this	  connection,	  note	  also	  that	  Crs	  semantics	  has	  variable	  assignments	  as	  its	  basic	  items,	  not	  the	  individual	  objects	  themselves	  as	  in	  Antonelli	  2013	  (cf.	  also	  the	  point	  made	  in	  Footnote	  5)	  –	  and	  this	  difference	  mattered,	  e.g.,	  to	  treating	  dependence	  and	  independence	  of	  variables.	  	  12	  For	  instance,	  Antonelli’s	  guarded	  translation	  shows	  similarities	  with	  the	  embedding	  of	  the	  basic	  neighborhood	  logic	  into	  standard	  relational	  polymodal	  logic	  in	  Kracht	  and	  Wolter	  1999.	  
 8 
	   ∃xy...	  ϕ	  	  	  introducing	   tuples	   of	   objects	   in	   a	   way	   that	   is	   no	   longer	   definable	   from	   iterated	   single	  quantifiers,	   though	   the	  base	   logic	  of	  polyadic	  quantifiers	   remains	  decidable.	  Antonelli,	   too,	  discusses	  such	  quantifiers,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  to	  us	  if	  these	  represent	  a	  substantial	  extension	  to	  what	  might	  be	  the	  natural	   formalism	  for	  his	  generalized	  quantifier	  models.	  What	   logical	  language	  best	  fits	  these	  models?	  13	  	  A	   less	  radical	  approach	  would	   look	  at	  basic	  A-­‐logic,	  or	   its	  underlying	  more	  general	  quanti-­‐fier	  Q-­‐logic,	  adding	  the	  standard	  existential	  quantifier	  ∃	  and	  perhaps	  others	  with	  their	  usual	  meanings,	   the	   same	   way	   we	   kept	   the	   standard	   Boolean	   operators	   fixed	   in	   his	   logic.	   This	  richer	  language	  allows	  us	  to	  move	  some	  of	  the	  earlier	  semantic	  observations	  (e.g.,	  those	  on	  correspondence)	  into	  the	  object	  language.	  For	  example,	  the	  non-­‐emptiness	  condition	  in	  the	  semantics	  of	  the	  quantifier	  Ex	  is	  expressed	  by	  the	  first-­‐order	  formula	  	  	  	   Ex.ϕ	  →	  ∃x.ϕ	  	  We	  forego	  further	  exploration	  of	  this	  multi-­‐quantifier	  system.	  	  
Wider	  semantics,	  or	  narrower	   fragments?	  A	  general	   theme	   in	  our	  own	  work	  has	  been	  a	  search	  for	  precise	  correspondences	  between	  two	  perspectives:	  	  	   (a) generalizing	  a	  semantics	  for	  a	  whole	  logical	  language,	  and	  (b)	  sticking	  to	  standard	  semantics	  for	  a	  suitably	  chosen	  matching	  fragment	  of	  that	  language.	  	  	  What	   fragment	  of	   first-­‐order	   logic	   then	  matches	  basic	  A-­‐logic?	  One	  answer	   is	   the	  subset	  of	  the	  Guarded	  Fragment	  that	  one	  gets	  through	  Antonelli’s	   translation	  for	  the	   local	  semantics	  (modulo	   the	   above	   qualifications).	   Are	   there	  more	   perspicuous	  matching	   fragments?	   And	  what	  about	  the	  weaker	  base	  logic	  that	  we	  obtained	  by	  restricting	  the	  Equivalence	  Rule	  to	  its	  algebraic	  essentials	  –	  or	  the	  still	  weaker	  logic	  of	  one	  arbitrary	  generalized	  quantifier?	  14	  	  
Conclusion	  With	   this	  brief	  note,	  we	  hope	   to	  have	   shown	   that	  Antonelli’s	   generalized	   first-­‐order	  semantics	  opens	  up	  new	  lines	  of	  inquiry	  that	  are	  well-­‐worth	  investigating,	  while	  it	  also	  ties	   in	   naturally	   with	   two	   major	   existing	   research	   programs:	   logics	   for	   generalized	  quantifiers,	  and	  modal	  logics	  with	  neighborhood	  semantics.	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